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ABSTRACT
Weaddress the problem of fairness and transparency
in onlinemarketplaces selling digital content, where
all parties are not actively participating in the trade.
We present the design, implementation and eval-
uation of VADER, a highly scalable solution for
multi-party fair digital exchange that combines
the trusted execution of blockchains with intelli-
gent protocol design and incentivization schemes.
We prototype VADER on Hyperledger Fabric and
extensively evaluate our system on a realistic testbed
spanning five public cloud datacenters, spread across
four continents. Our results demonstrate that VADER
adds onlyminimal overhead of 16% inmedian case
compared to a baseline solution, while significantly
outperforming a naive blockchain based solution
that adds an overhead of 764%.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online media consumption is a big business [13],
with users watching billions of hours of videos per
month [90] andmedia traffic constituting roughly
70% of downstream internet traffic [80].
A key reason for this success, lies in the sim-
plicity of present day online media (and money)
exchange process as depicted in Fig. 1. As shown,
a present day content creator can simply upload
content and get paid based on viewership (or sales).
Similarly, buyers can pay the right price to access
media without worrying about content authentic-
ity, price gouging, non delivery etc. The ease of
operation is due to presence of facilitators such as
Youtube, Netlflix, iCloud etc. As shown in Fig. 1,
the facilitator provides all the ancillary but criti-
cal services of content hosting, searching, deliv-
ery, payments etc. to complete the digital ecosys-
tem for online media consumption. While the ef-
ficacy of present day media delivery systems is
# Authors are listed in alphabetical order.
Figure 1: Present day video exchange
reflected in their success, they suffer from an im-
portant shortcoming in the inability to guarantee
honest behavior and vulnerability to fraudulent be-
havior by participants. This is due to the fact that
present day systems lack the underpinnings to demon-
strably guarantee honest behavior; forcing both
buyers and owners to trust that a facilitator be-
haves in a fair manner.
For example in Fig. 1, the owner trusts the fa-
cilitator to honestly report the number of views/-
downloads and calculate its royalty payments in
a transparent manner. Similarly, the buyer trusts
the facilitator to deliver the right content against
payment. Finally, the facilitator expects the buyer
to pay for a successful delivery, without falsely al-
leging non-delivery.
However, lack of baked-in guarantees of hon-
est behavior can lead to disputes, such as a buyer
fraudulently alleging non-receipt of content and
denying payments thus stealing content from fa-
cilitator; facilitatormis-reporting sales to cheat owner
of dues, or even charging buyers without provid-
ing right content.
In fact, recent events highlight the inadequacy
of this trust based model [17, 19, 86]. Specifically,
content owners have raised a number of complaints
against faclitators regarding their royalty earnings
and lack of clarity in the calculation [10, 18, 67],
highlighting discrepancies in earningswith reported
viewership. Similarly, buyers have also raised dis-
putes regarding content received from these plat-
forms [2].
We believe that such disputes can only increase
in future to the detriment of the growth of online
media delivery platforms. This in turn, motivates
us to address this important problem of guaran-
teeing successful video exchange amongst mutu-
ally untrusting buyers and facilitators. We ensure
each party (owner, buyer and facilitator) gets their
rightful outcome or no one does. We define the
above asMulti-party fair digital exchange (ab-
breviated as fair exchange in the rest of the paper)
among the owners, buyers and facilitators in the
marketplace model.
Note that prior work [30, 48, 49] for providing
fairness are not applicable in the above setting as
they trust the facilitator to grant access to inter-
nal logs and metrics, an important assumption we
intend to avoid. Similarly, decentralized video de-
livery platforms [32, 40, 62, 64, 88] which bypass
centralized facilitators (thus obviating the need
to trust them), while promising are not suitable.
This is due to the fact that decentralized content
delivery platforms suffer from poor content qual-
ity, sporadic availability, rampant illegal content
etc., ironically due to absence of a facilitator’s ded-
icated resources in maintaining the platform [20].
Motivated by above observations, we set our
goal to develop a readily usable solution for fair
exchange, which would be a)compatible and incre-
mentally deployable with present day facilitator driven
marketplace systems and b) should be able to pro-
vide transparency and fairness into existing video
delivery platforms with minimal overhead in terms
of modifications and performance.
In this paper we present the system design, im-
plementation and evaluation of Verifiable and Au-
ditable Digital Interchange Framework (VADER)
which satisfies the above mentioned criteria.
In process of designing VADER, we study vari-
ous fraud risks that arise in themarketplacemodel
and note that guaranteeingmulti-party fair exchange
in this model presents a unique challenge.As shown
in Fig. 1, the owner is a passive party, in the sense
that after video upload, it is not directly involved
in the exchange of video and money between the
active parties viz. the facilitator and buyer. Being a
passive party, an owner is completely dependent
on the honesty of facilitator, as it has no way to
learn of exchanges of its content being done. This
makes the owner vulnerable to beingmisled about
its true earnings, either by the facilitator [10] alone,
or in collusion with the buyer [2, 9]. Fig 1, high-
lights the specific risks faced by the respective par-
ties.
We note thatwhile the problem of fair exchange
among active parties is well studied in theory [47,
71, 78, 89]; to the best of our knowledge, protect-
ing rights of passive parties, without significantly
altering the flowof video exchange 1 is a new para-
digm for fair exchange, not yet covered in literature.
In VADER we not only protect the buyer and
facilitators against various active party risks but
secure owner’s interest from passive party risks.
To the best of our knowledge, VADER is the first
real system to demonstrate such capabilities.
VADER accomplishes low overhead fair exchange
solution by leveraging the following key insights,
→Insight 1) We can guarantee fair exchange by
sending encrypted video and performing fair ex-
change of only the key andmoney. This enables us
to leverage the existing optimized delivery infras-
tructures of facilitators for sending (encrypted) con-
tent andmaking system for fairness incrementally
deployable.
→Insight 2)By assuming the presence of a trusted
arbitrator that is slow (when compared to direct
interaction without intermediary) but can deter-
ministically detect a malicious party and provide
restitution (right encrypted content, key ormoney)
to the honest party, parties can opportunistically
exchange key and money directly between them-
selves without having to interact with the arbitra-
tor unless there is a dispute.
→Insight 3)Assuming parties are rational, intro-
duction of bounties (that are large and funded by
penalizing malicious parties) for reporting misbe-
havior introduces an element of distrust between
parties, thus preventing collusion aimed at sub-
verting the protocol. Note that, the first two in-
sights enable efficient operation, guaranteeing fair-
ness for the active parties; while the third insight
ensures fairness for the passive party under as-
sumption of rational participants.
We select blockchain as the tamper-proof ledger
and execution platform for VADER. Our selection
of blockchain is motivated by the fact that it offers
decentralization of trust and auditability guaran-
tees sought by VADER. Furthermore, the native
blockchain cyptocurrency can be used to design
incentivization schemes and programmatically en-
force desired behavior from the interacting par-
ties as mandated by our insights above. We also
1i.e., without making owner also an active party by say asking
for its approval on every trade
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point out the second insight of opportunistic ex-
changes on fast path (batching), while reverting
to the slow but guaranteed path is also used in
state-channels for scaling transaction throughput.
However, these solutions involve native assets such
as cryptocurrencies giving complete control to the
arbitrator to revert back the state (e.g. ownership)
of an asset. On the other hand, we deal with non-
native assets such as decryption keys which once
delivered to the buyer are unaffected by blockchain
asset state. We modify the state-channel protocol
to account for the above oddity, as described in
Sec. 3.1.
As part of this work, we have systematically
studied exchange process in present day video de-
livery platforms and used the insights to design
and implement VADER. VADERprotocol carefully
combines insights from diverse domains of cryp-
tography, incentives design, blockchains to ensure
fair exchange for video exchange. VADER is incre-
mentally deployblewithminimalmodifications to
present day video delivery platforms. Specifically,
in Sec. 3 we design VADER protocol (message ex-
change sequence) and perform a comprehensive
security analysis to show how VADER protects
honest parties against attacks in Sec. 3.4. We im-
plement VADER incorporating all the insights de-
scribed above and extensively study the perfor-
mance of VADER over two baseline techniques,
through extensive evaluation across realistic work-
loads.
We note that while we use video as an exam-
ple digital asset in this paper, VADER works for
any digital content [5, 6, 11, 12] that can be prov-
ably verified, say using cryptographic digests. Ad-
ditionally, the owner in VADER is a logical ab-
straction that can represent multiple entities that
need to be paid royalties individually, as in themu-
sic industry [67]. Finally, VADER focuses on guar-
anteeing fair exchange between the buyer, facilita-
tor and owner. VADER does not address the com-
plementary issue of content piracy, where a buyer
buys content legally on a VADER based market-
place and then resells it with minor modifications.
Other works [15, 81], including recent work [66]
use a combination of content watermarking and
on-blockchainpenaltymechanisms to prevent con-
tent piracy which can be easily embedded into
VADER smart contracts.
We believe that fair exchange systems will be
the norm in near future and our work advances
the nascent area of designing practical systems
for Multi-Party Fair exchange. We claim the fol-
lowing as key contributions: 1) To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to formulate and
present the problem of multi-party fair digital ex-
change in third party marketplace scenario where
one of the parties is passive and does not directly
interact with the buyer (Sec. 1 & 2). 2)We design
the VADER protocol and study its security prop-
erties. 3) We implement VADER protocol on Hy-
perledger Fabric, and extensively evaluate its per-
formance on a realistic test-bed of upto 91 nodes
spread over 4 continents, transferring at least 50TB
of data over the network. We find that VADER
adds onlyminimal overhead of 16% inmedian case
compared to the baseline VANILLA solution.
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. In Sec. 2, we formally describe the prob-
lem and the solution requirements. In Sec. 3, we
describe our solution and discuss the security anal-
ysis of our work in Sec. 3.4. We present details of
VADER implementation in Sec. 4 and in Sec.5, we
present performance evaluation of VADER under
realistic conditions. In Sec. 6, we discuss the re-
latedwork and finally conclude our paper in Sec. 7
2 PROBLEM SETUP
We define Owner (O) as a party, such as artists
or financiers, that need to be monetarily compen-
sated for every successful trade/download of the
digital content. We define Facilitator(F) as a party
responsible for conducting the trade on behalf of
O. Finally, we define a Buyer(B) as a party that is
buying digital content from F’s marketplace.
As explained in Sec. 1, O is the passive party
while B and F are active parties in the digital ex-
change. Further, we assume the parties do not com-
pletely trust each other and B and O do not know
each other. We also assume that the parties are
rational and will collude with each other to maxi-
mize profit.
A Multi-party Fair Digital Exchange proto-
col in the above context, should ensure that either
all parties receive their desired item in exchange
for their own item/service, or none of the parties
receive anything. Specifically, Multi-party Fair
Digital Exchange guarantees the following be-
havior: a) A B will always get the correct video
uploaded by O if it can submit proof of payment
b) A F will always get paid if it can submit evi-
dence of sending the correct video c) An O will
always get paid if F was paid by selling its con-
tent.
Attacks: A fair exchange protocol for video de-
livery must protect against the following attacks:
Atk.1- Royalty Manipulation: constitutes any
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manipulation in the royalty calculation of O e.g.
a malicious F can cheat O by a) misreporting the
number of downloads or b) selling the content to
B at a higher price while compensating O with a
lower royalty by exploiting the information asym-
metry between B and O. Atk.2- Content Mis-
match: constitutes delivery of content to a B that
is different from the one promised while receiv-
ingmoney.Atk.3- Content Stealing: constitutes
gaining access to the content without compensat-
ing the designated parties for their fair share of
payment for the same, e.g.B getting access to con-
tent without paying money to F by claiming to
have received wrong content despite getting right
content, thus cheating both F and O.
Under our threat model, the above attacks rep-
resent a completely exhaustive list of attacks on
marketplace fairness.We reiterate that VADER does
not address the complementary issue of content
piracy, and is compatible with other solutions [15,
66, 81] that address piracy.
3 SOLUTION DESCRIPTION
Wedescribe VADER protocol by presenting an out-
line of the solution in Sec. 3.1 and the details of
various protocol steps in Sec. 3.2. We also, present
a security analysis of our protocol in Sec. 3.4.
•Notation: We use the following notation in the
description of our solution. Let λ be a security pa-
rameter, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a cryptographi-
cally secure hash function, (Gen(λ),Enc(k,m),Dec(k,m))
be a IND-CCA secure symmetric encryption sch-
eme and (KeyGen(λ),Siдn(sk,m),Veri f y(pk,m,σ ))
be a public key cryptosystem based secure digital
signature scheme. We assume that at bootstrap,
each party generates a key pair (pk, sk)usingKeyGen.
We use L to represent the distributed blockchain
ledger and ζ to represent a state channel between
two parties.
3.1 Solution Outline
VADER aims to deliver an efficient solution for
guaranteeing fair exchange by leveraging the three
insights described in Sec. 1. Following the first in-
sight, F utilizes its usual content delivery infras-
tructure to send encrypted video to B thereby re-
ducing the problem of fair video exchange to that
of fair exchange of key and money.
Fig. 2 depicts the phases of video exchange us-
ing VADER. In the Initialization phase, leverag-
ing the second insight, F and B lock money in
the blockchain escrow to create a channel, akin
Algorithm 1 Conditional Escrow Contract
IOU :=< sender , recvr , $amt >
1: function OpenEscrow(B,amt ,σB , τ , cond)
2: if Veri f y(pkB ,amt ,σB) = true then
3: eid ← дenEscrow()
4: eid .[owner ,bal , timeout , cond] ←
5: [B,amt , τ , cond]
6: return eid
7: function ProcessIOU ([IOU (s)], evidence)
8: if blockht ≤ eid .timeout AND
9: Veri f y(evidence, eid .condition) then
10: for each iouinIOU (s) do
11: bal -= iou.amt
12: send(iou.recvr , iou.amt)
13: functionCloseEscrow(eid )
14: if blockht ≥ timeout then
15: send(eid .owner , eid .balance)
Algorithm 2 State Channel Contract
τ represents the settlement timeout
1: function Open(B,Bamt ,σB ,F,Famt ,σF ,τ )
2: ζ= GenChannel()
3: ζ .cid ← {0, 1}k
4: ζ .timer_started = f alse
5: ζ .B.escrow = OpenEscrow(BBamt ,σB , τ )
6: ζ .F.escrow = OpenEscrow(F Famt ,σF , τ )
7: ζ .timeout , ζ .state = τ , Open
8: L.Store(ζ )
9: function Close(ζ ,ChanUpdateMsдs)
10: if ζ .timer_started AND blockht ≥
ζ .timeout
11: return
12: for eachm ∈ ChannelUpdateMessaдese do
13: Veri f yValidity(m)
14: iou =m.extractIOU ()
15: ProcessIOU (ζ .escrow(s), iou)
16: L.Store(ζ .timer_started = true)
17: function settleChannel(cid )
18: if ζ .timer_started AND blockht ≥
ζ .timeout
19: CloseEscrow(ζ .escrow(s))
20: L.Store(ζ .state = Closed)
to state-channels [42, 74]. We define channel as a
unique bi-directionalmessage queue between two
parties, backed with blockchain escrowed money,
enabling parties to conduct multiple exchanges di-
rectly without hitting blockchain (Channel con-
struction and lifecycle described later). Thismoney
is then used as collateral in the Exchange and Fi-
nalization phases where the B and F exchange
4
Figure 2: Video exchange lifecycle in VADER Figure 3: VADER message exchanges
money and video directly offchain. Finally, in the
Penalization and Settlement phase, disputes, if any,
are resolved deterministically by the trusted ar-
bitrator on-chain as shown in Fig. 2 and escrow
money appropriately redistributed toB and F. We
note that, as shown in Fig. 2 only Initialization and
Settlement phases interact with blockchain, while
exchange and finalization phases are executed di-
rectly between B and F without hitting the block-
chain. Moreover, O being the passive party does
not have any actions during the exchange and fi-
nalization steps of the protocol.
VADER leverages the trusted execution of a suite
of blockchain deployed smart contracts, to emu-
late a trusted arbitrator. The trusted arbitrator (in
settle phase) works as follows: 1) Any party can
close the channel either due to dispute or logical
end of application exchange, and submit evidence
of protocol compliant behavior to the smart con-
tract, if any 2) VADER allows the counterparty
to submit counterfactual evidence within a pre-
determined time period to state its view of the
offchain protocol state. As shown in Fig. 2, the
VADER smart contracts evaluate the evidence sub-
mitted by both parties and then either transfer
money to B (refund) or F (payment) from an es-
crow that is funded in the initialization phase.
Finally, motivated by the third design insight,
VADER protocol design introduces a bounty sch-
eme that rewards B with a much larger monetary
benefit, by penalizing F (compared to cost of the
video) if it can submit evidence of cheating by F
to the arbitrator. As mentioned before, under as-
sumptions of rationality, the penalty scheme pre-
vents collusion between F and B in which they
both agree to alter the offchainmessage exchanges
between themselves for mutual benefit (by divid-
ing O’s share between themselves), and submit
the altered sequence in the settlement phase, thereby
cheating O of its fair share. By making it more
beneficial for B to report F and collect bounty, in
turn, forcing F to honestly report exchange infor-
mation to the arbitrator, VADER ensures the pas-
sive party, O, gets its rightful share. Finally, we
note that VADER uses two well known constructs
described below.
Evidenceof protocol compliance: VADER lever-
ages cryptographic commitment schemes and dig-
ital signatures over messages exchanged between
F and B as evidence of protocol compliant behav-
ior by blockchain based trusted arbitrator.
Conditional Escrow: This construct allows par-
ties to prove solvency to each other as the first
step of digital exchangeby lockingmoney on block-
chain and guaranteeing that the money cannot
be unilaterally withdrawn by either party. This
construct is used by the trusted arbitrator to lock
money (crypto-currency) for a duration (τ ) in the
initialization phase and deterministically release
money (IOU ) based on submission of evidence (cond)
for VADER protocol compliant operation in set-
tle phase. Alg. 1, shows a conditional escrow con-
tract, wherein an entity can lock money(amt ), for
a duration of time(τ ). Money(IOU ) is releasable
before τ only on successful evaluation of condi-
tion cond . Alg. 1 in Appendix shows pseudocode
for conditional escrow contract.
Our state channel construction builds on top of
the conditional escrow contract. In Alg. 2 we pro-
vide our state channel algorithm providing open,
close and settle semantics. In addition to the one’s
in Alg. 2 our state channel supports the follow-
ing properties (used in subsequent algorithms), 1)
ζ .Store and ζ .Load:- which is the per party local
channel storage where each party can save mes-
sages, 2) ζ .Send and ζ .Recv:- usingwhich one party
can send a message to the other party involved in
the state channel.
3.2 Solution Description
As mentioned in Sec. 3.1, VADER proceeds in the
four phases as depicted in Fig. 2. We describe the
specifics of each of the phases next.
5
Algorithm 3 Content Registration
amtO ⊲ % Royalty O should receive per Xchg
1: function O.UpContent(C,n,amtO )
2: c1, c2, . . . , cn = C
3: idC = {H (c1),H (c2), . . . ,H (cn)}
4: m =< idC ,amtO ,pkO ,pkF >
5: Send <C ,m, σO = Siдn(skO ,m)> to F
6: Receive < Ack,vid > from F
1: function F.RecvContent(L)
2: On Recv < C,m,σO > from O
3: if Veri f y(pkO ,m,σO ) , true then
4: terminate
5: id ′
C
= {H (c1),H (c2), . . . ,H (cn)}
6: < idC ,amtO ,pkO ,pkF >=m
7: if (m.idC , id ′C ) then
8: terminate
9: vid = H (H (c1)|H (c2)| . . . |H (cn))
10: σF = Siдn(skF , <m,σO >)
11: L.Store(vid,m,σO,σF )
12: Send < Ack,vid > to O
Algorithm 4 Trade Agreement
idC ⊲ The content which B is requesting
priceidC ⊲ Bid price B wants to pay
costidC ⊲ Ask price which F wants
1: function B.ContentReq(ζ , idC ,priceidC )
2: reqid ← {0, 1}k ;
3: m =< ζ .cid, reqid, idC,priceidC >
4: σB = Siдn(skB,m);
5: ζ .Send(M0 <m,σB >) to F;
6: ⊲ M1 is generated in ServContentReq
7: M1 <m,σB ,σF > = ζ .Recv() from F
8: ζ .Store(M0,M1)
1: function F.ServContentReq(ζ , F, B)
2: M0 <m,σB > = ζ .Recv() from B
3: if Veri f y(pkB ,m,σB) , true then
4: ζ .Close()
5: < reqid, idC ,priceidC >=m
6: if (priceidC , costidC ) then
7: ζ .Close()
8: if (reqid is prev. known in ζ ) then
9: ζ .Close()
10: σF = Siдn(skF , (m,σB))
11: M1 =<m,σB ,σF >
12: ζ .Send(M1) to B
13: ζ .Store(M0,M1)
• Phase 1: Initialization: This phase involves
O uploading content to the F and B setting up a
channel to be used for multiple exchanges with F.
Init.1 O - F Content Registration: As shown in
Alg 3, Owners register their content for sale in the
marketplace by uploading the contentC(={c1..n})
composed of chunks c1, ...cn along with its digest
idC={H (c1),. . . ,H (cn)} and amtO , the percentage
to be given to O for each sale of C (for privacy
reasons amtO is encrypted with the public key of
F). On receiving C , F verifies the message signa-
ture and records O as the unique owner and F
as an authorized distributor on blockchain. Note
that content registration is a one time operation
between the O and F. At the end of this step, the
rightful ownership of video content is established
on blockchain.
Init.2 B - F Channel Creation: During initial-
ization, B funds the channel (with F) with crypto-
currency (sufficient for multiple video exchanges)
by locking money in an on-chain escrow. Simi-
larly, F also makes an initial deposit, that is much
larger compared to Bś deposit (to cover penalties
described later). Once both deposits are commit-
ted to blockchain, the state channel contract gen-
erates a unique channel id cid that is used to bind
subsequent message exchanges between B and F
to the channel.
• Phase 2: Exchange: The exchange phase is the
core of VADER, as shown in Fig.2, where F and
B perform exchange of the digital content. Fig. 3
shows the messages used in the construction of
VADER exchange protocol as described below.
Xchg.1 Exchange Agreement: The goal in this
step is to ensure that bothB and Fmutually agree
on the video to be exchanged and the price to be
paid by B to F. As depicted in Alg 4, B submits
to F the Exchange Request message, M0, (m=<cid ,
reqid , idC , priceidC>, σB ), containing the channel
id cid , video identifier idC , a randomly generated,
strictly monotonically increasing reqid , as well as
the amount priceidC that B agrees to transfer on
successful exchange. On receiving M0, F checks
that the reqid is indeed monotonically increasing,
to ensure reqid is not reused (explained later in pe-
nalization scheme), and the transfer price is agree-
able. In return, F sends counter-signed message
M1 = <M0,σF> to B, committing to the terms.
Xchg.2 Out-of-Band Encrypted Video Trans-
fer: Next, based on insight 1, as depicted in Alg 5
F randomly samples key k and sends encrypted
version of the requested video along with signed
hashes of each individual encrypted chunk
idE={H (Ek (c1 . . . cn))} inM2 to B.
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Algorithm 5 Offline Video Exchange & B Ack
t ⊲ Timeout B uses waiting for enc. content
1: function F.SendContent(ζ ,C, reqid)
2: k = Gen(λ)
3: e1, . . . , en = Enc
k (c1), . . . , Enc
k (cn)
4: idE = {H (e1), . . . ,H (en)}
5: ζ .Send(< E =< e1, . . . , en >, idE >) to B
6: M2 < idE ,σB > = ζ .Recv() from B
7: σF = Siдn(skF , idE)
8: M3 =< idE ,σF ,σB >
9: ζ .Send(M3) to B
10: ζ .Store(M2,M3)
1: function B.RecvContent(ζ , reqid, t )
2: < E, idE >= ζ .Recv() from F
3: Save E =< e1, . . . , en >
4: id ′
E
= {H (e1), . . . ,H (en)}
5: for each i in idE do
6: if id ′
E
[i] , idE[i] then
7: Request F for correct ei , idE[i]
8: Start timer t ; On Timeout:
9: if correct chunk is received within t :
10: Update ei , idE[i]
11: else
12: ⊲Matching chunk& hash is not received
13: ζ .Close()
14: σB = Siдn(skB, idE)
15: ζ .Send(M2 < idE ,σB >) to F
16: ⊲ M3 is generated in SendContent
17: M3 < idE ,σF ,σB > = ζ .Recv() from F
18: ζ .Store(M2,M3)
On receiving encrypted video, B verifies if the di-
gest matches with the one sent by F in M2. In
case of amatch,B sends counter signed Encrypted
Video Acknowledgement in M3=<M2,σB>. In case
of a digest mismatch, B requests F for retransmis-
sion of specific chunks until either agreement is
reached or failure after certain number of retries.
In the next step, B and F exchange key andmoney
in a trustworthy manner.
Xchg.3 Money-Key Exchange: In this step, as
shown in Alg 6, B 1) sends an optimistic IOU mes-
sageM4 to F, and 2) starts a timer t within which
F needs to send the key k . In case of timeout, B
closes the channel and initiates dispute resolution.
On receiving the IOU, F releases the key along
with digest inM5.
• Phase 3: Finalization: In this phase, B verifies
whether it received the right content or raises a
dispute.
Final.1 Verification: As shown in Alg 7, B de-
crypts the video usingk and verifies that {H (Deck (c1
Algorithm 6 Exchange
t ⊲ Timeout B uses waiting for k
1: function B.SendIOU(ζ , reqid,priceidC , t )
2: IOU =< I = pkB ,OU = pkF ,priceidC >
3: σB = Siдn(skB, IOU )
4: ζ .Send(M4 < IOU ,σB >)to F:
5: Start timer t ; On Timeout:
6: if k is not received then
7: ζ .Close()
8: M5 < k,σF >= ζ .Recv() from F
9: B.DecryptAndVeri f y(ζ , reqid,k,σF )
10: ζ .Store(M4,M5)
1: function F.SendKey(ζ , reqid,k)
2: M4 < IOU ,σB > = ζ .Recv() from B
3: if Veri f y(pkB , IOU ,σB) , true then
4: ζ .Close()
5: if IOU .I , B or IOU .OU , F then
6: ζ .Close()
7: if IOU .priceidC , priceidC then
8: ζ .Close()
9: σF := Siдn(skF ,k)
10: ζ .Send(M5 < k,σF >) to B
11: ζ .Store(M4,M5)
Algorithm 7 Decrypt And Verify
1: function B.DecryptAndVerify(ζ , k,σF )
2: c1, . . . , cn = Dec
k (e1), . . . ,Dec
k (en)
3: id ′
C
= {H (c1), . . . ,H (cn)}
4: < cid, reqid, idC,priceidC >= ζ .Load(M1).m
5: for each i in idC do
6: if idC [i] , id
′
C
[i] then
7: ⊲ Collect dispute evidence from channel
8: M = ζ .Load(M1,M3,M4,M5)
9: ζ .Close()
10: RaiseDispute(B, F,M , reqid, i, ci)
11: C =< c1, . . . , cn >
12: Everything OK. Continue Trade
. . . cn)} matches idC uploaded by O. In case of
match,B has received desired content and the same
channel can be re-used for future exchanges. How-
ever, in case of a mismatch, i.e. F sent wrong con-
tent, B closes the channel and registers a dispute
with the Dispute Resolve smart-contract by sub-
mittingM =< M1,M3,M4,M5 > as evidence along
with at least one of the mismatched chunks, ci .
Final.2 Channel Balance Update:At the end of
a successful exchange, each party locally updates
the channel balance of the counterparty and de-
cides if the channel has sufficient balance to con-
tinue or must be closed.
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Algorithm 8 Dispute Resolve Smart Contract
M =< M1,M3,M4,M5 > ⊲ Dispute evidence
1: function RaiseDispute(B, F,M , reqid, i, ci)
2: < idE ,σF ,σB >← M .M3
3: < IOU ,σB >, < k,σF >← M .M4, M .M5
4: if k is null or H (E(k, ci )) , idE(i) then
5: Start timer τ ; On Timeout:
6: if (No k from F within τ ) OR
7: (F gives k but H (E(k, ci )) , idE(i))
8: goto ReturnMoneyToB
9: < cid, reqid, idC,priceidC >← M .M1.M0
10: if H (ci ) = idC (i) then
11: ⊲ B Cheated, No Loss to F
12: return
13: else ⊲ F Cheated.
ReturnMoneyToB:
14: F.escrowBalance -= priceidC
15: B.escrowBalance += priceidC
As shown in the Fig. 2, in both phase 2 & 3, B&
F do not interact with blockchain and carry out
opportunistic exchanges (based on insight 2).
• Phase 4: Settlement:At the end of multiple ex-
changes, F and B submit all their offchain state to
blockchain smart contracts (trusted arbitrators) to
settle channel balance, resolve disputes and auto-
matically pay O based on the number of success-
ful exchanges.
Settle.1ChannelClosure and Settlement:Akin
to state-channels, VADER channel closing seman-
tics guarantee that once a party closes the chan-
nel, the other party has up to time τ to submit its
set of offchain signed messages as evidence to the
channel settlement smart contract. After time τ ,
the smart contract verifies the validity of each of-
fchain message sequence and first settles the suc-
cessful exchanges by transferring money worth
∑
i priceidC to F and
∑
i (amtO%) to O from chan-
nel escrow. Disputes are settled as described next.
Settle.2DisputeResolution: In case of a dispute
raised by B the Dispute Resolve Contract Alg. 8
performs two steps to identify the faulty partici-
pant as described below 1) In line 4, it encrypts the
disputed chunk with key k (if present) and checks
if the hash of the encrypted chunk matches the
one agreed by B inM3. In case of key not released
dispute by B, F has time τ within which to submit
k . 2) In line 10, it computes hash of the chunk and
checks if it matches with the hash registered by
O in Init.1. A faulty facilitatorwill fail step (2) if
chunk is indeed different from the one registered
Algorithm 9 Penalizer Smart Contract
bounty: penalty amount
cid : channel id for <BF>
1: function B.SubmitClaim(B, F, cid,M1,M ′1)
2: < cid, reqid, idC,priceidC ,σB ,σF >← M1
3: < cid ′, reqid ′, id ′
C
,price ′
idC
,σ ′
B
,σ ′
F
>← M ′1
4: if Veri f ySiдns(B, F, [M1,M
′
1]) , true then
5: ⊲ Message signatures Invalid.
6: return
7: if (<reqid ,cid> = <reqid ′,cid ′>) AND
8: (idC , id
′
C
) then
9: ⊲ F-B collusion attack detected
10: ⊲ Penalize F and reward B
11: F.escrowBalance -= bounty
12: B.escrowBalance += bounty
by O; otherwise, the request is discarded because
of faulty buyer behavior. Once the faulty party is
detected, channel escrow balance is appropriately
transferred to the honest party.
At the end of settlement and dispute resolution,
offchain channel state is transferred on-chain, and
application progresses, disputes continuing directly
on blockchain with each party submitting mes-
sages directly to blockchain instead of each other.
We note that VADER automatically pays out roy-
alty to O based on the successful exchanges sub-
mitted to blockchainduring settlement phase. There-
fore, VADER guarantees O fairness as long as B
and F honestly report their offchain messages on
chain and do not colludewith each other. We next
describe howVADER handles collusion between a
malicious B and F and still guarantees O fairness.
3.3 Preventing F-B Collusion
The offchain execution of VADER between B and
FmakesO vulnerable to a collusion attack 2where
in B and F submit an altered set of offchain mes-
sage exchanges during settlement to denyO of its
fair share. We explain how such collusion can be
undertaken next, followed by the description of
the technique used to prevent such attacks.
OffchainAlternateMessageConstruction: Con-
sider the case where B and F have completed a
successful exchange of video idC owned byO. Note
that at this point, F has already received IOU and
2The problem does not occur in case one of B or F are honest,
as the adherence to protocol by any one party will force the
other party to act honestly or loose out.
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B the desired file. Therefore, both parties are in-
centivized to collude to maximize profit by con-
structing a new set of message exchanges simulat-
ing 1)B requesting video id ′
C
owned by a sybil en-
tity (O’) controlled by F benefitting F , 2) F agree-
ing for price priceid ′
C
much lesser than priceidC
benefiting B. As part of alternate message con-
struction, B creates a new Exchange Request Mes-
sage M ′0, (m=<cid , reqid , idC ′, priceid ′C>,σB ) with
video id idC ′. Note that a rational B will reuse
the <cid ,reqid> pair, since creating either a new
cid ′ or reqid ′ makes B vulnerable to F submit-
ting it as legitimate evidence of exchange to block-
chain, and withdrawing Bs money. We leverage
the above nuancedmessage construction to detect
and penalize collusion.
Penalizer Smart Contract: Specifically, follow-
ing insight 3, we introduce another smart contract,
Penalizer Alg 9, which will pay B a large penalty
from F’s funds (deposited during channel funding
in Init.2), if it can submit a pair of M1,M ′1 mes-
sages, in line 2 & 3, having same reqid and cid
but different content id’s idC , id ′C . The penaliza-
tion scheme introduces an element of distrust be-
tweenB and F and prevents collusion, forcing them
to honestly report their offchain exchanges dur-
ing settlement. In summary, our penalty scheme
ensures that in a realistic setting, where most buy-
ers are not controlled by F, the F is disincentivized
to colludewithB, for fear of paying a heavy penalty.
Consequently our protocol guarantees fairness to
all three parties viz. O, F and B.
LimitationsWe note that the offchain nature of
VADER entails a buyer (or its delegatee [68]) to
continuously remain online, and maintain signifi-
cant local state, as well as lock up sufficient liquid-
ity in channel till settlement. Consequently, VADER
may not be appropriate for light weight clients
that are ephemeral, lack local state or cannot af-
ford to lock liquidity for long time, and depend
solely on blockchain for tamper-proof logging and
availability. We evaluate this model in Sec. 4.
Extension to multiple O, F, B : In reality multi-
ple parties can assume any of the roles in a single
exchange (say multiple O of same content). Note
that our protocols will work for even in such set-
tings as long as all parties do no completely trust
each other. This is due to the fact that any new en-
tities participation will either be essential to the
exchange and in which case, their concerns will
be similar to that of an active party, whose rights
are protected by VADER protocol. Alternatively,
the party might not be essential for completing
the exchange, in which case, their concerns will
be similar to that of passive party which are also
safeguarded by VADER protocol.
3.4 Security Analysis of VADER
In this sectionwe show that VADER is secure against
RoyaltyManipulation, ContentMismatch andCon-
tent Stealing attacks (Atk.1,2,3) defined in Sec. 2.
We reiterate that as mentioned in Sec. 2 we do not
address the orthogonal issue of content piracy.
Theorem3.1. Under the assumptions that, a) the
digital signature scheme is unforgeable, b) the cryp-
tographic hash function is collision-resistant and c)
under honest majority, blockchain attributes (smart-
contract execution and ledger) are tamper-resistant,
we show that VADER protects fairness of honest
and rational parties against Atk.1, 2 & 3.
• Atk.1: VADER ensures that in presence of at
least honest F or B, all exchanges are recorded
onto the blockchain during channel close either
successfully or as a dispute. In case both F & B
are malicious, VADER introduces distrust to pre-
vents collusion between them through incentive
techniques mentioned in Sec.3.3, forcing them to
record correct state on the blockchain. Further, in
VADER O’s royalty is calculated inside the block-
chain trusted arbitrator (smart contract). So under
the assumption (c) any royalty manipulation at-
tack will not be feasible given honest majority of
blockchain participants.
•Atk.2 & 3:We analyse Atk.2, 3 in individual ma-
licious parties and collusion cases as follows:
→MaliciousO: A malicious Omay target a con-
tent mismatch attack (Atk.2) by sendingmismatch-
ing content (C, idC ) in Init.1, but for an honest F to
accept mismatching content and hashes, O needs
to find a collision in the hash function which is
assumed impossible, making this attack infeasible.
Content stealing (Atk.3) is useless forO as it owns
the very content.
→Malicious F: For a malicious F to successfully
launch a content mismatch (Atk.2), it has to send
a content C ′ instead of C as requested by B. An
honest B will not accept that unless F manages
to find a collision in H such that H (C ′) = H (C).
Hence, under collision-resistant hash function as-
sumption, Atk.2 does not occur. Content stealing
(Atk.3) is meaningless for F and will not occur as
it arguably owns the very content.
→Malicious B: A malicious B can try to mount
content mismatch attack Atk.2 by raising a fraud-
ulent complaint against F after receiving the cor-
rect content. However, since B and F exchange a
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co-signed messageM3 agreeing to (Ek (C), idE), B
cannot generate Fs sign on a (Ek (C ′), id ′
E
) due to
the unforgeability of signatures assumption. Sim-
ilarly, it cannot raise a complaint with Dispute Re-
solvewithout submitting amismatching chunkwhich
when encrypted under k leads to the same hash,
without finding a collision in the hash function,
which is assumed impossible.
A malicious B cannot steal content(Atk.3) from
F as as an honest F will not transfer the decryp-
tion key k without payment in message M4 and
Dispute Resolve contract ensures that B provides
IOU to F before handing over the key k .
→ O-F Collusion: A malicious O cannot help F
with content mismatch attack (Atk.2) to cheat B
by providing wrong content as an honest B re-
quests for a particular content in the Xchg.1 step.
Since O has no control over this step, this attack
reduces to a malicious F case, which we already
explained the protocol to be secure against. Also
bothO and F arguably own the content, hence ob-
viating the need for content stealing attack (Atk.3).
→ B-O Collusion: Content mismatch (Atk.2) &
stealing (Atk.3) attacks in this casewould beB and
O trying to exchange content throughVADER but
denying payment to F. To this end, O may try to
submit wrong (C ,idC ) in Init.1 step, in order for
B to raise a dispute. An honest F will not coun-
tersign a mismatching (C, idC ), unless O finds a
collision in H which by assumption is impossi-
ble. Apart from Init.1, O does not participate in
the remaining protocol, reducing these attacks to
the malicious B case, which the protocol is secure
against.
Note that the case of mutually known O and B
carrying out entire exchange among themselves
without involving F, is orthogonal to the VADER
setting wherein B and O do not know each other.
→ B-F Collusion: Rational B and F will not let a
contentmismatch attack (Atk.2) and content steal-
ing attack (Atk.3) to occur respectively as they are
hurt by the same.We ignore the case where a F (or
any fake O’ ) sells the content to a B outside our
ecosystem as that is a case of content piracy.
Under all the possible cases (corruption and col-
lusion), VADER is secure against Atk.1, 2 and 3,
thus completing the proof. We briefly highlight
the reason for VADER to be secure even with mul-
tiple F, O or B in Sec. 3.3.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We compare the performance of VADER against
the following two baselines
VANILLA: We implemented VANILLA to emulate
traditional HTTPS basedvideo delivery as described
in RFC [72]. VANILLAprotocoldoesnot use block-
chain enabling us to benchmarkperformance over-
head of VADER over state-of-art mechanisms.
BlockchainMediatedExchange (BME): To un-
derstand the benefits of batching protocol mes-
sages, we implement BMEprotocol wherein F and
B progress application state directly on blockchain
instead of directly sending to each other as in VADER.
In BME, akin to VADER, video is transferred of-
fchain in encrypted format, while each exchange
is directly settled onchain before starting the next.
We note that in BMEparties need not open& close
a channel, and somemessages can be batchedwhile
committing to blockchain, requiring only 3 com-
mits (i.e. <M0,M1>, <M2,M3,M4> & <M5>) in hap-
pens before order. We incorporate the above opti-
mizations in our implementation of BME.
Application Prototype: We implement F as a
Django webapp (868 SLOC), O (256 SLOC) & B
apps for VADER (699 SLOC), VANILLA (348 SLOC)
and BME (617 SLOC), as Python applications.
Smart Contracts:We implement all VADER and
BME functionalities as chaincodes (Smart Contracts)
on top ofHyperledger Fabric [52] v1.2 (Fabric) [23].
We implement chaincode utilities for time estima-
tion based on block height and conditional (time
and condition locked) escrow accounts (no native
crypto-currency in Fabric v1.2).
Maliciousness:We emulate a malicious F as one
that sends non-matching chunk hashes to B. Sim-
ilarly, a malicious B is emulated by raising a dis-
pute with the Dispute Resolve smart contract even
after receiving the correct video from F.
5 EVALUATION
In our evaluation, we answer the following, 1) the
performanceoverhead of VADER compared to base-
line protocols, 2) the amortization benefits of VADER,
3) the effect of maliciousness on VADER perfor-
mance, 4) the sensitivity of VADER to the under-
lying blockchain platform.
• Experimental Setup:We run our experiments
on 91 VMs (Ubuntu, 2.1GHz 16 CPU, 32GB, SSD)
in Softlayer Cloud [7], across five geo-distributed
data centers spanning four continents. Based on
benchmarking, average latency was estimated at
0.4ms (and throughput 5Gbps) for intra-DC and
varied 21.8-337ms (throughput 460-35.6Mbps) for
inter-DC network. All experiments were conducted
with a Fabric network consisting of 10 blockchain
peers (one per F reflecting a network run by the
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line for an honest B exchang-
ing 20 files, 20MB each under
CDN topology
Fs) running the default ordering service with out
of the box configuration parameters [1].
• Performance Metrics: We use the following
metrics for quantifying performance overhead of
the three schemes:1) end-to-end (e2e) timemea-
sures time elapsed from the instant B requests a
file till it’s last chunk is ready for consumption
(downloaded and decrypted) is our primary met-
ric; 2) component contributions measured as
the fraction of time spent in each sub component
obtained by dividing e2e time into three components–
a) Protocol Time is the total time spent in block-
chain interactions andmessage exchanges between
the parties; b) Transfer Time is the time taken
for transferring encrypted chunks; c) VerifyTime
is the time spent by B in decrypting and verifying
hash of the exchanged file. In the presence of mali-
ciousness, this sub-component includes the time
spent in interacting with the dispute resolution
smart-contract;
• Experimental Methodology: We benchmark
the performance of VANILLA, VADER & BME un-
der different realistic conditions by varying the
underlying network topology, load on F and over-
all maliciousness in the system. Unless stated oth-
erwise, we run our experiments for five iterations
and report average results.
5.1 Macro Benchmarks
In this sectionwe benchmark the performanceover-
head of all three schemes under realistic settings.
We run 500 Bs in 5 DCs (100 Bs per DC, equally
load-balanced among 5 VMs). The Bs are config-
ured to exchange a 20MBfile in chunks of 512KB 3,
random number of times (10 to 250, in increments
of 5). We run 10 Fs in 10 VMs equally distributed
3Empirically determined to be optimal, results omitted for
sake of brevity.
across the 5 DCs. We configure 10% of the Fs to
be malicious (as described in Sec. 4).
5.1.1 CDN topology:We emulate a CDN like hi-
erarchical topology implemented by real world fa-
cilitators [20, 87] where a B exchanges content
from the nearest (same DC) F and measure e2e
time for all the three schemes.
PerformanceOverhead:Non-Malicious: In Fig. 4a,
we plot the CDF of (median) e2e time for VADER
and BMEBs, normalized to VANILLA.VADER adds
onlyminimal overhead to VANILLA ranging from
min. 12% to 16% at the median, making it a prac-
tically deployable system for providing fairness
at scale. Notably 80% of the VADER Bs have an
overhead of less than 23%. In contrast, BME has
an overhead ranging from min. 690% to 764% at
the median. This is due to the fact that VADER in-
teracts with blockchain only twice (channel open
and close) over multiple successful exchanges, while
BME interacts with blockchain thrice for each ex-
change.
In summary, VADER is able to amortize block-
chain interaction time over multiple exchanges lead-
ing to minimal performance overhead compared to
VANILLA (16%) whereas, lack of amortization leads
to significant degradation in BME (764%).
Performance overhead:Malicious:We also ob-
serve that maliciousness (10% of Fs) causes severe
performance degradation shown by a lot worse
performance (notch at 90%) for both VADER and
BME. VADER adds an overhead of atleast 1160%
while BME adds 9400% respectively for clients of
malicious Fs. The performance degradation can
be attributed to the overhead imposed by onchain
execution ofDispute Resolve contract involving sign
verification and waiting for settlement timeouts.
as described in Alg. 8.
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Blockchain Bitcoin Ethereum Litecoin Siacoin Monero Zcash Peercoin Dogecoin
Consensus PoW PoW PoW PoW PoW PoW PoW & PoS Pow
Block Gen. Time(s) 545.52 14.58 149.82 600.00 121.56 150.00 484.38 62.52
VADER (s) 5.88 0.57 1.92 6.42 1.64 1.92 5.26 1.05
BME (s) 1637.04 44.22 449.95 1800.48 365.17 450.48 1453.63 188.04
Table 1: VADER&BME average e2e expected latencies (per 20MBfile) for public blockchain net-
works while batching 200, 20MB file exchanges in a session. Block generation time for Siacoin
is from [4], for rest, 1/1/2019 from [3]. PoW = Proof Of Work, PoS = Proof of Stake
5.1.2 Random topology: Next we evaluate the
performance of VADER under a different network
topology viz. random. We repeat the same experi-
ment above, but allowing Bs to exchange content
from a random F in any DC this time 4.
Fig. 4b shows that compared to VANILLA,VADER
has aminimal overhead of 23% at the median com-
pared to BME’s 391%. Interestingly, BMEhas lesser
overhead in this scenario compared to the CDN
scenario. This is due to the inter-dc network con-
ditions thatmake network transfer times relatively
worse for a large number of Bs across all three
schemes. Consequently, overall network transfer
time increases while the blockchain overhead re-
mains the samemaking BME incur relatively lesser
overhead compared to CDN topology.
Note that, VADER maintains its minimal over-
head (23%) compared to VANILLA even under ad-
verse network conditions making it deployable over
a variety of network topologies.
5.1.3 Analysis of a single CDN experiment:
To get a better understanding of when a file is
available for viewing by a B (startup latency), we
randomly select a single B from the CDN experi-
ment. and depict the timeline of all file exchanges
(20MB, 20 times), for all three schemes in Fig. 5.
We note that, barring the one time channel open
delay (1.61s), VADER adds only a minimal delay
compared to VANILLA for each file, thereby not
adversely affecting user experience. On the other
hand, BME adds significant delay per file due to its
three commit blockchain overhead added to each
file.We also observe that, barring channel open and
close overheads (3.2s), VADER adds only 7% delay
over vanilla, making it a viable system.
5.1.4Estimatedperformance onPublicBlock-
chain Networks: We evaluate the sensitivity of
4 Due to inter-dc network limitations and also to reduce the fi-
nancial cost of the experiment, we restrict our file size to 5MB,
keeping number of exchanges same (10 to 250). (To validate re-
sults, we have manually run experiments with 20MB files and
found similar trends as reported).
VADER to underlying blockchain platform by es-
timating it’s performance on various public block-
chains listed in Tab. 1. For this study, we calculate
the median e2e time of a single file for VADER
& BME and isolate it into two components viz.
‘blockchain protocol’ time and ‘miscellaneous’ time
involving network transfer and crypto operations.
We estimate blockchain protocol time for VADER
by dividing twice the block generation time of the
underlying blockchain (one each for channel open-
close) by the number of file exchanges. For BME
we calculate protocol time as thrice the block gen-
eration time (corresponding to the three blockchain
commits). Finally we add the miscellaneous over-
head for both protocols to get the projected time
taken by each.
We observe that even in the case of public block-
chains, VADER’s amortization benefits drastically
outperform BME. In the case of blockchain net-
works with high block generation time (such as
Bitcoin) VADER is able to achieve 27.21Mbps,mak-
ing it practical even on public blockchains, while
BME throttles down to 0.01Mbps.On the other hand,
in the case of a blockchain like Ethererumwith lower
block generation time, VADER can achieve nearly
280Mbps, which is comparable to VANILLA’s 384Mbps.
5.2 Micro benchmarks
In this section, we validate our design choices by
benchmarking the performance of various system
sub components. We allocate 10 VMs running a
single F each, and run 200 Bs in 20VMs (20 buy-
ers per vm). We configure Bs to exchange a 20MB
file in chunks of 512KB, 50 times randomly from
any F. Default maliciousness is set to 0% (unless
specified otherwise).
5.2.1 e2e time vs #files: Fig. 6 shows the effect of
increasing #files (5 to 200) on average e2e time per
file for a constant file size of 20MB. We observe
that VADER overhead compared to VANILLAkeeps
decreasing with increasing no. of files, from 90%(5
files) to 13%(200 files). Clearly, VADER is able to
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amortize blockchain overhead over multiple files.
On the other hand, note that the e2e time for BME
increases rapidlywith the no. of files, from 4.14s(5)
to 18.7s(200) since BME bottlenecks by hitting the
blockchain for each file.
5.2.2 e2e time vs #buyers: Next we study the ef-
fect of loading F by increasing no. of Bs from 10
to 50 per F, keeping filesize (20MB) and #files (50)
constant. In Fig. 7, we observe that VADER’s over-
head increases from a mere 7% (0.71s) at 100Bs to
31% (4.24s) at 500 Bs. This is explained by the ex-
tra load imposed on the Fs by the signing and ver-
ification, steps of VADER. In contrast, BME’s e2e
time increases rapidly from 3.35s to 30.84s, due to
the extra load on the blockchain layer (replicated
execute and consensus) imposed by the increas-
ing no. of commits, from increasing B count.
5.2.3ComponentAnalysis: Fig. 8 shows the com-
ponent contribution (defined in Metrics, Sec. 5)
towards e2e time of a file for VADER and BME
protocols with increasing #Bs per F. We observe
that for VADER there is a 10x increase in network
transfer time (from 0.34s to 3.35s), while proto-
col time increases 5x from 0.125s to 0.61s with in-
creasing Bs. The large network transfer time in-
crease in VADER is attributed to the fact that an
increasing no. of Bs simultaneously fetch content
(flash crowd) thereby putting more stress on Fs
and the underlying network. (We note that VANILLA
network transfer time behaves in a similar fash-
ion). On the other hand, the protocol time for BME
increases rapidly (from 2.84s to 29.7s)with increas-
ing #Bs while the network transfer time remains
the same at around 0.34s. This is due to the fact
that in the case of BME Bs, the blockchain com-
mit wait times provide a more spaced out execu-
tion and F network time remains constant.
5.2.4 Effect of Maliciousness: We study the ef-
fect of maliciousness by increasing maliciousness
from 0% to 100% and plot average e2e time for
VADER and BME in Fig. 9. 5Weobserve that VADER
starts with lower e2e time (1.53s) compared to BME
(7.2s) for 0%maliciousness, while VADER e2e time
increases with increasing maliciousness and com-
ing closer to BME. This is due to the fact that after
the first dispute, VADER closes channel and con-
tinues application progress directly on blockchain
similar to BME.
In theworst case of 100%maliciousness, VADER
begins to have higher completion time compared
to BME due to the additional channel open-close
overhead. In Fig. 10, it is interesting to note that in
case of VADER, even in the presence of malicious-
ness, the non-malicious parties remain unaffected,
and only Bs interacting with a malicious F incur
higher e2e time. For example, e2e time for 60% of
Bs is less than 1.65s with 40% maliciousness and
jumps to 5.76s right after; and it is less than 1.59s
for 20% of Bs in 80% maliciousness, after which it
jumps to 6.34s.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review and contrast our work
with existing work on building fair, auditable and
decentralized systems.
•BlockchainPlatforms:Beginningwith Bitcoin [70],
the recent past has seen the emergence of a num-
ber of blockchain platforms [33, 44, 52, 76, 77, 85],
that provide a tamper proof immutable ledger of
transactions as well as smart contract capabilities
secured by an underlying consensus protocol. The
various blockchain platforms vary in their choice
5 VANILLA does not have a dispute resolution mechanism,
hence, we don’t run VANILLA in experiments benchmarking
maliciousness.
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maliciousness. (20MB, 50 times)
of consensus protocol, transaction privacy mod-
els, as well as membership in the blockchain net-
work. Permissioned/consortiummodel restricts block-
chain access to only a few users/organizations, while
permissionless model allows any node to join and
participate in the network. Typical permissioned
blockchain platforms also support access control
capabilities at the smart contract layer to provide
confidentiality guarantees to higher layer block-
chain applications. VADER relies on granular ac-
cess control, as well as tamper-proof smart contract
execution and auditability of blockchain platforms,
to guarantee multi-party fair exchange, even in the
presence of passive participants.
• Blockchain Scalability: The underlying con-
sensus protocol overhead limits the scalability of
blockchains. Recent solutions to addressing scala-
bility broadly fall in two buckets.
Layer 1 Solutions: These solutions involve mak-
ing onchainmodifications to the underlying block-
chain design such as changing the block size [31]
or block generation time [63]. The authors in [43]
adopt a leader election based consensus algorithm
for achieving faster consensus and block genera-
tion fairness in bitcoin. [22, 38, 58, 65] implement
sharding to scale transaction throughput wherein
the main blockchain is divided into multiple inde-
pendent shards within which transactions can be
validated in parallel, and finally merged into the
main chain. Algorand [46] uses a committee based
consensus protocol, while RapidChain [91] uses a
mix of sharding and committee based consensus
to improve the scaling further.We note that even
if the above works are able to improve transaction
throughput to a few thousand transactions per sec-
ond, blockchain consensus will still impose a ceiling
on transaction throughput
Layer 2 Solutions: An alternate design to scale
throughput is to decouple transaction processing
speed from the underlying blockchain protocol by
reducing the number of interactionswith the block-
chain. Payment channels [74, 79] and generalized
state channels [37, 42, 69, 73, 82, 84] enable parties
to directly transact with each other off-chain and
finally batch multiple transactions into a single
blockchain transaction. This allows applications
to scale independent of the blockchain protocol
while offering security guarantees at par with na-
tive blockchain. While state channels help in scal-
ing, they require 1) all parties to be known to each
other apriori and 2) all parties (or their delega-
tee [68]) to continuously remain online. On the
other hand, VADERworks even when parties are not
known to each other apriori and one of the parties
is passive and offline (content owner).
• Fair Exchange: Fair exchange is a well studied
problem, especially fairness for electronic commerce
[25]. Two party fair exchange without a trusted
third party (TTP) is known to be impossible [47,
71, 78, 89] without relaxing security requirements.
Recentworks have looked at designing blockchain
based protocols for fair exchange [24, 56, 60, 61].
Bentov et.al [29] describe a bitcoin based claim-or-
refund framework for fair exchange in which ei-
ther parties receive the intended goods or are com-
pensatedmonetarily. Building on this, the authors
in FairSwap [41] describe a framework that enable
a sender and receiver to exchange digital goods
such as files in a fair manner through the use of
a ‘judge’ smart contract. Choudhuri et.al[36] de-
sign protocols that ensure fairness in securemulti-
party computation using blockchain-like primitives.
The above protocols guarantee fairness only between
the active parties and do not cover passive partici-
pants, whereas VADER guarantees fairness even for
passive parties.
•DecentralizedMarketplaces:Recentworks on
blockchain based decentralized marketplaces al-
low buyers and sellers to trade directly with each
other without a centralized platform [27, 55, 57,
62, 83]. In these systems, dispute resolution is han-
dled offline in an ad-hoc manner, providing no
guarantees on fairness. VADER on the other hand
guarantees fair exchange and is better aligned with
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existing centralized marketplaces.
•VideoStreaming:Most commercial video stream-
ing services [14, 16] followRFC [72] that describes
the streaming of video over HTTP(S). There has
been significant research in the design, measure-
ment and characterization and optimization of scal-
able video streaming systems like [20, 21, 28, 39,
45, 59, 75, 87] characterize the end to end perfor-
mance of a commercial video streaming service
and identify a number of bottlenecks across dif-
ferent layers of the stack. Similarly, [87] studies
policies used for server selection in the Youtube
CDN network. while the authors in [26] study the
effects of CDN augmentation techniques such as
P2P-CDN and telco-CDN federation on videowork-
loads. Similarly, on the client side, a number of bi-
trate adaptation algorithms have been developed
with the goals of minimizing buffering, start up
latency, improving video smoothness etc.We note
that above prior work’s focus on improving end user
experience ard orthogonal to VADER’s focus on guar-
anteeing fairness.
• Auditing Mechanisms: A number of works
have looked at auditing running systems. PeerRe-
view [49] leverages tamper-evident logging to de-
tect when a node deviates from the expected be-
haviour. AVMs [48] on the other hand, use logging
to record all incoming/outgoing messages from
a VM and ensure correct execution of a remote
system. [30] helps ad system operators debug rev-
enue problems through multi-dimensional analy-
sis of various metrics. However, the approach re-
quires access to logs and other internal system
metrics. Such works are not applicable in our set-
ting as we do not trust facilitators to act honestly.
Recent works have also focussed on auditing the
working of web systems [34, 35, 50, 51, 53, 54]
through black box measurements to detect viola-
tions in application defined fairness.However, these
works are limited to detecting unfair practices and
do not provide any mechanisms for guaranteeing
fairness of the participants.
•Complementary Technologies:We highlight
complementary technologies that VADER can lever-
age to further enhance the security of the plat-
form. Mangipudi et.al [66] use a combination of
contentwatermarking and on-chain penaltymech-
anisms to prevent content piracy which can be
easily embedded into VADER smart contracts. Emerg-
ing technologies such as Intel SGX [8] that pro-
vide computational integrity and verifiability through
hardware mechanisms could be leveraged for pro-
tecting the confidentiality of videos stored on the
video server.
7 CONCLUSION
We introduce the problem of Multi-party fair ex-
change for digital assets, which requires safeguard-
ing the rights of active and passive participants.
We propose a protocol to ensure Multi-party fair
exchange for digital assets, by leveraging block-
chain and intelligent incentive alignment.We build
a prototype of the protocol on Hyperledger Fabric
and extensively evaluate performance of our ap-
proach across a realistic test bed and show results
that demonstrate the feasibility of our system.
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